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1 pure reason
Философия: чистый разум -
2 pure reason
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3 the critique of pure reason
Философия: Критика чистого разумаУниверсальный англо-русский словарь > the critique of pure reason
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4 Critique\ of\ Pure\ Reason
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5 pure
adjective(lit. or fig.) reinit is madness pure and simple — es ist schlicht od. ganz einfach Wahnsinn
* * *['pjuə]1) (not mixed with anything especially dirty or less valuable: pure gold.) pur2) (clean, especially morally: pure thoughts.) rein3) (complete; absolute: a pure accident.) völlig•- academic.ru/59133/purely">purely- pureness
- purity
- purify
- purification
- pure-blooded
- pure-bred
- pure and simple* * *[pjʊəʳ, AM pjʊr]1. (unmixed) rein, pur\pure alcohol reiner [o fachspr absoluter] Alkohol\pure chocolate unverfälschte Schokolade\pure cotton reine Baumwolle\pure gold reines [o pures] Gold, Feingold nt fachspr\pure orange juice/honey reiner Orangensaft/Honig\pure German shepherd reinrassiger deutscher Schäferhundthe film was \pure Disney der Film war Disney purthat's \pure guesswork das sind bloße Vermutungenthe hot bath was \pure bliss das heiße Bad war eine wahre Wohltatthat was \pure hell for us das war die reinste Hölle für uns\pure chance reiner Zufalla \pure delight eine reine [o wahre] Freude\pure insanity glatter Wahnsinn, kompletter Schwachsinn famfor \pure joy aus reinem [o nur zum] Vergnügen\pure luck reines Glück, reiner Zufall\pure and utter rubbish ausgemachter Blödsinn\pure and simple schlicht und einfach4. (free of evil) unschuldig, rein\pure feelings reine Gefühle\pure intentions ehrliche [o geh lautere] Absichten\pure motives uneigennützige Motivea \pure vowel ein Monophthong m fachspr9. (abstract) rein, theoretisch\pure geometry projektive [o synthetische] Geometrie fachspr\pure mathematics reine [o abstrakte] Mathematik fachspr\pure reason reine Vernunftas \pure reason that makes perfect sense rein theoretisch ist das vollkommen klar* * *[pjʊə(r)]adj (+er)by pure chance — durch puren Zufall, rein zufällig
a pure wool dress —
blessed are the pure in heart (Bibl) — selig, die reinen Herzens sind
* * *1. a) pur, unvermischt, rein (Seide etc):pure alcohol reiner Alkohol;pure white reines Weißb) lupenrein (Diamant)2. rein, makellos:pure Italian reines Italienisch;a pure friendship eine reine Freundschaft3. rein, sauber (Hände etc)4. (moralisch) rein:a) unschuldig, unbeflecktb) unberührt, keusch (Mädchen)5. rein, unverfälscht6. MUSa) (ton)reinb) obertonfrei7. klar (Stil)8. BIOLa) reinrassig, -blütigb) homozygot, reinerbig:pure line reine Abstammungslinie9. rein, theoretisch:pure science reine Wissenschaft10. rein (Kunst)11. pur, rein, völlig (Unsinn etc):a pure formality eine reine Förmlichkeit;laziness pure and simple reine Faulheit12. rein, pur (Zufall):13. rein (Sprachlaut)* * *adjective(lit. or fig.) reinit is madness pure and simple — es ist schlicht od. ganz einfach Wahnsinn
* * *adj.echt adj.rein adj. -
6 pure
1) ( unmixed) rein, pur;\pure alcohol reiner [o fachspr absoluter] Alkohol;\pure chocolate unverfälschte Schokolade;\pure cotton reine Baumwolle;\pure orange juice/ honey reiner Orangensaft/Honig;\pure German shepherd reinrassiger deutscher Schäferhundthe film was \pure Disney der Film war Disney pur;that's \pure guesswork das sind bloße Vermutungen;the hot bath was \pure bliss das heiße Bad war eine wahre Wohltat;that was \pure hell for us das war die reinste Hölle für uns;\pure chance reiner Zufall;a \pure delight eine reine [o wahre] Freude;\pure insanity glatter Wahnsinn, kompletter Schwachsinn ( fam)for \pure joy aus reinem [o nur zum] Vergnügen;\pure luck reines Glück, reiner Zufall;\pure and utter rubbish ausgemachter Blödsinn;\pure and simple schlicht und einfach4) ( free of evil) unschuldig, rein;\pure feelings reine Gefühle;to be \pure in heart ein reines Herz haben ( geh)\pure motives uneigennützige Motive9) ( abstract) rein, theoretisch;\pure reason reine Vernunft;as \pure reason that makes perfect sense rein theoretisch ist das vollkommen klar -
7 reason
1. [ʹri:z(ə)n] nI1. причина; основаниеwhat is the reason of the tides? - почему бывают приливы?
what is the reason of the dew? - почему выпадает роса?
by reason of..., for the reason that... - по причине того, что..., из-за того, что...
the scheme failed by reason of bad organization - этот план провалился из-за плохой организации
for no other reason than that I forgot - разг. по той простой причине, что я забыл
with reason - с основанием, по основательным причинам
with good reason - с полным правом /основанием/, совершенно обоснованно
2. (субъективное) основание, мотив, соображение; оправданиеfor reasons of State - обыкн. ирон. по государственным соображениям
reasons for and against doing smth. - соображения за и против какого-л. поступка
to give reasons for doing smth. - а) объяснить свои поступки; б) изложить мотивы, по которым что-л. должно быть сделано
to prove with reasons - доказать аргументами, представить резонные соображения
I have good reason to fear that... - у меня все основания /я имею полное право/ опасаться, что...
I have good reasons for doing [for saying] this - я имею полное право поступать так [так говорить]
did he give any reason? - он привёл какие-л. доводы?; он что-нибудь привёл в своё оправдание?
give me your reasons for refusing - мотивируйте свой отказ, изложите мотивы вашего отказа
alleging as his reason that... - мотивируя тем, что...
for reasons best known to oneself - разг. по каким-то таинственным соображениям
all the more reason for going /why I should go/ - (мне) тем более следует уехать
the reason why I dislike him is... - он мне не нравится потому, что...
3. объяснение, обоснование; мотивированное заявлениеa woman's reason см. woman 1
reasons adduced - юр. мотивы постановления суда
to give /to yield, to render/ (a) reason - предоставить /дать/ объяснения (своему поведению и т. п.)
4. лог. малая посылка ( силлогизма)II1. разум, интеллектpure reason - филос. чистый разум
2. 1) здравый рассудок (в противоп. сумасшествию)to lose one's reason - сойти с ума, помешаться
2) часто разг. здравый смысл, благоразумие, здравомыслиеto bring smb. to reason - образумить кого-л.
to listen to /to hear/ reason - внять доводам рассудка; прислушаться к голосу разума
to speak /to talk/ reason - говорить /судить/ здраво
you can't make him listen to reason, he will not listen to reason - он и слышать ничего не хочет, его не убедишь
there is reason in what you say - в том, что вы говорите, есть здравый смысл
it is quite within reason to suggest... - благоразумно предположить...; здраво рассуждая, можно предположить...
in reason - а) в разумных пределах; б) в соответствии со здравым смыслом; разумно
it is not in reason to expect me to... - было бы неразумно /странно/ ожидать, что я...
I'm willing to do anything in reason - в разумных пределах я готов сделать всё
out of all reason - чрезмерный; ≅ ни в какие ворота не лезет
it stands to reason - а) разумеется; понятно; ясно, очевидно ( в ответах); б) здравый смысл подсказывает
it stands to reason that... - всякому здравомыслящему человеку понятно, что...; отсюда явно следует, что...
as in reason - как и следовало ожидать; как и следует
without rhyme or reason см. rhyme I ♢
3. редк. разумный поступок; (благо)разумное поведениеit is reason, reason is - это (будет) благоразумно
it is no /not/ reason - это (будет) неразумно
2. [ʹri:z(ə)n] vit is but reason that I should rejoice - вполне понятно, что я радуюсь
1. 1) размышлять, рассуждать (логически); делать выводы, умозаключатьto reason about /of, on, upon/ a subject - обдумывать что-л.; размышлять /раздумывать, рассуждать/ о каком-л. предмете
to reason from premises - делать вывод из посылок; сделать логический вывод
to reason that... - прийти к выводу, что...
I reason in this way on the matter - я прихожу к такому выводу по этому вопросу; я так рассуждаю /сужу/ об этом деле
2) мыслитьthe ability to reason makes man different from animals - способность мыслить отличает человека от животного
2. обсуждать; дебатировать, дискутировать; рассуждать ( вслух)to reason what is to be done - обсуждать, что (нужно) сделать
to reason why [how] smth. was done - рассуждать о том, почему [как] что-л. было сделано
3. 1) (with) уговаривать, урезонивать (кого-л.)we reasoned with him for an hour - мы целый час его урезонивали /пытались его убедить/
2) (into) уговорить, убедить (в чём-л.)to reason smb. into smth. /into doing smth./ - уговорить кого-л. сделать что-л.
to reason smb. into obedience [into accepting a proposal] - уговорить кого-л. подчиниться [принять предложение]
3) (out of) разубеждать (в чём-л.)to reason smb. out of smth. /out of doing smth./ - отговорить кого-л. от чего-л.; разубедить кого-л.
to reason smb. out of his fears - убедить кого-л. в неосновательности его опасений
to reason smb. out of a false belief - убедить кого-л. в неосновательности его убеждения
4. преим. p. p. обосновывать, аргументировать; доказыватьto reason that... - аргументировать /мотивировать/ тем, что...; приводить в качестве довода то, что...
you must reason your case a bit more - вы должны лучше обосновать /аргументировать/ свою позицию
his speech was admirably reasoned - его выступление было прекрасно аргументировано
♢
their's not to reason why ( Tennyson) - не их дело рассуждать о причинах -
8 reason
n1) причина, основание2) соображение, мотив3) разум, интеллект• -
9 reason
n1. причина, підстава2. аргумент, мотив, міркування3. пояснення, обґрунтування, мотивована заява- legitimate reason законна підстава- pure reason філос. чистий розум- sound reason важлива причина- valid reason переконливий доказ- faith in reason віра в розум- to distort the true reasons спотворити правдиву причину- for demagogic reasons за демагогічними уявленнями- for humanitarian reasons з гуманних міркувань- for reasons of national security з точки зору національної безпеки -
10 reason
ˈri:zn
1. сущ.
1) разум, рассудок, ум, интеллект bereft of reason Syn: mind, brain, intellect, mentality
2) благоразумие, здравомыслие;
здравый смысл within reason ≈ в пределах разумного to stand to reason ≈ быть ясным, понятным;
казаться само собой разумеющимся It stands to reason that the majority party will be reelected. ≈ Кажется разумным, что снова будет избрана партия большинства. I'll do anything for you within reason. ≈ Я сделаю для Вас все в пределах разумного. sound reason Syn: prudence, discretion
3) а) причина, повод, основание, основа by reason of ≈ по причине;
из-за to have a reason for not going ≈ иметь уважительную причину, чтобы не идти( куда-л.) The real reason behind their decision was never made public. ≈ Настоящая причина этого решения никогда не объявлялась. The reason that/why she did it is a mystery. ≈ По какой причине она это сделала, остается загадкой. He quit for personal reasons. ≈ Он уволился по личным причинам. cogent reason compelling reason convincing reason every reason plausible reason strong reason sufficient reason underlying reason urgent reason valid reason б) соображение, мотив;
довод, аргумент;
оправдание (against;
behind;
for) personal reason
2. гл.
1) рассуждать, размышлять (about, of, upon - о чем-л.) ;
делать выводы Syn: think, consider
2) убеждать, уговаривать( into) to reason out of smth. ≈ разубеждать в чем-л. to reason with smb. ≈ урезонивать кого-л. reason into
3) аргументировать, обосновывать;
доказывать, приводить доводы a carefully reasoned analysis ≈ тщательно аргументированный анализ Syn: argue
4) уст. обсуждать, дискутировать Syn: discuss ∙ reason against reason away reason out reason with Syn: argue причина;
основание - the * of eclipses причина затмений - what is the * of the tides? почему бывают приливы? - what is the * of the dew? почему выпадает роса? - she had a * for laughing у нее была причина для смеха - by * of..., for the * that... по причине того, что..., из-за того, что... - the scheme failed by * of bad organization этот план провалился из-за плохой организации - for no other * than that I forgot( разговорное) по той простой причине, что я забыл - for *s beyond control по независящим обстоятельствам - with * с основанием, по основательным причинам - not without * не без основания - with good * с полным правом /основанием/, совершенно обоснованно - he complains with * у него есть основания жаловаться( субъективное) основание, мотив, соображение;
оправдание - for economy *s по соображениям экономии - for family *s по семейным обстоятельствам - for *s of State обыкн. (ироничное) по государственным соображениям - *s for and against doing smth. соображения за и против какого-л. поступка - to give *s for one's preference обосновать свой выбор - to give *s for doing smth. объяснить свои поступки;
изложить мотивы, по которым что-л. должно быть сделано - to prove with *s доказать аргументами, представить резонные соображения - I saw * to suspect him у меня были основания подозревать его - I have good * to fear that... у меня все основания /я имею полное право/ опасаться, что... - I have good *s for doing this я имею полное право поступать так - did he give any *? он привел какие-л. доводы?;
он что-нибудь привел в свое оправдание? - give me your *s for refusing мотивируйте свой отказ, изложите мотивы вашего отказа - alleging as his * that... мотивируйте тем, что... - the * behind the proposal мотивировка предложения - for *s best known to oneself( разговорное) по каким-то таинственным соображениям - I see no * to do this не вижу никакой необходимости делать это - all the more * for going /why I should go/ (мне) тем более следует уехать - the * why I dislike him is... он мне не нравится потому, что... объяснение, обоснование;
мотивированное заявление - a woman's * (ироничное) женская логика - *s adduced (юридическое) мотивы постановления суда - to give /to yield, to render/ (a) * предоставить (дать) объяснения (своему поведению и т. п.) (логика) малая посылка( силлогизма) разум, интеллект - pure * (философское) чистый разум - only man has * только человек - существо разумное здравый рассудок (в противоп. сумасшествию) - bereft of * умалишенный - to lose one's * сойти с ума, помешаться - his * failed him utterly его рассудок совершенно помутился - he was restored to * к нему вернулся рассудок (о сумасшедшем) часто( разговорное) здравый смысл, благоразумие, здравомыслие - to bring smb. to * образумить кого-л. - to listen to /to hear/ * внять доводам рассудка;
прислушаться к голосу разума - to speak /to talk/ * говорить /судить/ здраво - you can't make him listen to *, he will not listen to * он и слышать ничего не хочет, его не убедишь - there is * in what you say в том, что вы говорите, есть здравый смысл - contrary to * идущий вразрез со здравым смыслом - it is quite within * to suggest... благоразумно предположить...;
здраво рассуждая, можно предположить... - in * в разумных пределах;
в соответствии со здравым смыслом;
разумно - everything in * всему есть мера - to pay anything in * заплатить любую разумную цену - it is not in * to expect me to... было бы неразумно /странно/ ожидать, что я... - I'm willing to do anything in * в разумных пределах я готов сделать все - out of all * чрезмерный;
ни в какие ворота не лезет - the price is out of all * это несусветная цена - it cost me a sum out of all * я заплатил за это бешеные деньги - it stands to * разумеется;
понятно;
ясно;
очевидно( в ответах) ;
здравый смысл подсказывает - it stands to * that... всякому здравомыслящему человеку понятно, что...;
отсюда явно следует, что... - as in * как и следовало ожидать;
как и следует - as * was как подсказывал здравый смысл (редкое) разумный поступок;
(благо) разумное поведение - it is *, * is это (будет) благоразумно - it is no /not/ * это (будет) неразумно - it is but * that I should rejoice вполне понятно, что я радуюсь размышлять, рассуждать (логически) ;
делать выводы, умозаключать - to * about /of, on, upon/ a subject обдумывать что-л.;
размышлять /раздумывать, рассуждать/ о каком-л. предмете - to * from premises делать вывод из посылок;
сделать логический вывод - to * from past experience сделать выводы из опыта прошлого - to * that... прийти к выводу, что... - we must * from what is probable мы должны исходить из вероятности - I * in this way on the matter я прихожу к такому выводу по этому вопросу;
я так рассуждаю /сужу/ об этом деле мыслить - the ability to * makes man different from animals способность мыслить отличает человека от животного обсуждать;
дебатировать, дискутировать;
рассуждать (вслух) - to * what is to be done обсуждать, что (нужно) сделать - to * why smth. was done рассуждать о том, почему что-л. было сделано ( with) уговаривать, урезонивать (кого-л.) - we *ed with him for an hour мы целый час его урезонивали /пытались его убедить/ (into) уговорить, убедить ( в чем-л.) - to * smb. into smth. /into doing smth./ уговорить кого-л. сделать что-л. - to * smb. into obedience уговорить кого-л. подчиниться( out of) разубеждать (в чем-л.) - to * smb. out of smth. /out of doing smth./ отговорить кого-л. от чего-л.;
разубедить кого-л. - to * smb. out of his fears убедить кого-л. в неосновательности его опасений - to * smb out of a false belief убедить кого-л. в неосновательности его убеждения преим. р.р. обосновывать, аргументировать;
доказывать - to * that... аргументировать /мотивировать/ тем, что...;
приводить в качестве довода то, что... - you must * your case a bit more вы должны лучше обосновать /аргументировать/ свою позицию - his speech was admirably *ed его выступление было прекрасно аргументировано (with) (устаревшее) (библеизм) спорить или беседовать( с кем-л.) > their's not to * why (Tennyson) не их дело рассуждать о причинах actual ~ истинная причина bereft of ~ без сознания, без чувств bereft of ~ умалишенный ~ разум, рассудок;
благоразумие;
to bring to reason образумить;
to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума;
to lose one's reason сойти с ума ~ причина, повод, основание;
соображение, мотив;
довод, аргумент;
оправдание;
by reason of по причине;
из-за by ~ of its general sense по своему общему смыслу cogent ~ убедительная причина compelling ~ неопровержимый довод to give reasons (for smth.) объяснить причины (чего-л.), сообщить свои соображения (по поводу чего-л.) with (или not without) ~ не без основания;
he complains with reason он имеет все основания жаловаться ~ разум, рассудок;
благоразумие;
to bring to reason образумить;
to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума;
to lose one's reason сойти с ума ~ разум, рассудок;
благоразумие;
to bring to reason образумить;
to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума;
to lose one's reason сойти с ума primary ~ основная причина reason аргумент ~ аргументировать;
доказывать;
reason out продумать до конца ~ излагать мотивы ~ интеллект ~ мотив ~ обсуждать ~ основание ~ причина, повод, основание;
соображение, мотив;
довод, аргумент;
оправдание;
by reason of по причине;
из-за ~ причина ~ разум, рассудок;
благоразумие;
to bring to reason образумить;
to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума;
to lose one's reason сойти с ума ~ разум ~ рассуждать (about, of, upon - о чем-л.) ~ соображение ~ убеждать, уговаривать (into) ;
to reason out (of smth.) разубеждать (в чем-л.) ;
to reason (with smb.) урезонивать (кого-л.) ~ убеждать, уговаривать (into) ;
to reason out (of smth.) разубеждать (в чем-л.) ;
to reason (with smb.) урезонивать (кого-л.) ~ for remission of sentence основание для освобождения от наказания ~ for termination основание для прекращения ~ of complaint основание для подачи жалобы ~ of complaint основание для подачи иска ~ аргументировать;
доказывать;
reason out продумать до конца ~ убеждать, уговаривать (into) ;
to reason out (of smth.) разубеждать (в чем-л.) ;
to reason (with smb.) урезонивать (кого-л.) ~ to believe основание считать strong ~ веское основание strong: ~ сильный, веский;
серьезный;
strong sense of disappointment сильное разочарование;
strong reason веская причина valid ~ веское соображение valid ~ убедительный довод with (или not without) ~ не без основания;
he complains with reason он имеет все основания жаловаться -
11 Bibliography
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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12 Mind
It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)[Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive AnalysesRecent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind
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13 simple
'simpl1) (not difficult; easy: a simple task.) sencillo, fácil, simple2) (not complicated or involved: The matter is not as simple as you think.) sencillo, fácil, simple3) (not fancy or unusual; plain: a simple dress/design; He leads a very simple life.) simple, sencillo4) (pure; mere: the simple truth.) puro, mero5) (trusting and easily cheated: She is too simple to see through his lies.) ingenuo, cándido6) (weak in the mind; not very intelligent: I'm afraid he's a bit simple, but he's good with animals.) simple, tonto•- simplicity
- simplification
- simplified
- simplify
- simply
- simple-minded
- simple-mindedness
simple adj1. sencillo / simplethe food was simple, but very good la comida era sencilla, pero estaba muy buena2. fácil
simple adjetivo 1 (sencillo, fácil) simple; See also→ llanamente 2 ( delante del n) ( mero) simple;◊ el simple hecho de … the simple fact of …;es un simple resfriado it's just a common cold; un simple soldado an ordinary soldier 3 ( tonto) simple, simple-minded ■ sustantivo masculino y femenino simpleton
simple
I adjetivo
1 (sencillo) simple: estos ejercicios son muy simples, these exercises are very easy
una cámara de simple manejo, an easy-to-use camera
2 Ling Quím (no complejo, no compuesto) simple
oración simple, simple sentence
3 (mero, tan solo) mere, pure: somos simples espectadores, we are mere observers
fue simple casualidad, it was pure coincidence pey es un simple secretario, he's just a secretary
4 (cándido, sin malicia) naive, innocent pey (tonto) simple-minded, half-witted, foolish
II m (ingenuo, inocente) innocent, naive person pey (simplón, tonto) simpleton, half-wit ' simple' also found in these entries: Spanish: babosa - baboso - bendita - bendito - boba - bobalicón - bobalicona - bobo - borrica - borrico - clavar - compuesta - compuesto - hincapié - idea - lila - llaneza - mayoría - pánfila - pánfilo - pardilla - pardillo - preferir - sencilla - sencillo - simpleza - triste - vista - hechura - llanamente - mero - pretérito - puro - ya English: ago - arithmetic - dowdy - gravestone - mere - naked - plain - simple - simple interest - simple-minded - simple-mindedness - single-spacing - basic - simply - unsophisticatedtr['sɪmpəl]1 (easy, straightforward) sencillo,-a, fácil, simple2 (plain, not elaborate) sencillo,-a, simple3 (not compound) simple, sencillo,-a4 (plain, pure, nothing more than) sencillo,-a, puro,-a, mero,-a■ for the simple reason that... por la sencilla razón que...5 (unsophisticated, ordinary) simple, sencillo,-a6 (genuine, sincere) sencillo,-a; (foolish) tonto,-a; (naive, easily deceived) ingenuo,-a, inocente, simple; (backward, weak-minded) simple, corto,-a de alcances\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLsimple fracture fractura simplesimple interest interés nombre masculino simple1) innocent: inocente2) plain: sencillo, simple3) easy: simple, sencillo, fácil4) straightforward: puro, simplethe simple truth: la pura verdad5) naive: ingenuo, simpleadj.• batueco, -a adj.• bobo, -a adj.• bueno, -a adj.• fácil adj.• incapaz adj.• llano, -a adj.• mero, -a adj.• puro, -a adj.• párvulo, -a adj.• sencillo, -a adj.• simple adj.n.• simple s.m.'sɪmpəl1) ( uncomplicated) <task/problem> sencillo, simplethe machine is very simple to use — la máquina es de fácil manejo or es fácil de manejar
2) ( straightforward)the simple truth is (that)... — la pura verdad es que...
it's a simple statement of fact — es simplemente or meramente la constatación de un hecho
for the simple reason that... — por la sencilla razón de que...
3) (plain, unpretentious) <dress/food> sencillo, simple4)a) (unsophisticated, humble) simpleb) ( backward) simple, corto de alcances5) < interest> simple['sɪmpl]1. ADJ(compar simpler) (superl simplest)1) (=uncomplicated) [problem, idea, task] sencillo, simple•
it's as simple as that — la cosa es así de sencilla•
it should be a simple enough job — no debería ser un trabajo difícil•
keep it simple — no lo compliques•
the simplest thing would be to phone — lo más sencillo sería llamar por teléfono•
to be simple to make/use — ser sencillo de hacer/usar2) (=mere) simplea simple phone call could win you a week's holiday in Florida — con una simple llamada de teléfono podría ganar una semana de vacaciones en Florida
•
by the simple fact that... — por el simple hecho de que...•
to be a simple matter of doing sth — ser simplemente una cuestión de hacer algo3) (=elementary) simple•
a simple act of kindness — un simple acto de bondad•
the simple fact is... — la pura realidad es...pure 1., 1)•
for the simple reason that... — por la simple razón de que...4) (=not fussy) [dress, style, food] sencillo5) (=unsophisticated) [person, life, pleasures, pursuits] sencillo•
the simple things in or of life — las cosas sencillas de la vida6) * (=mentally retarded) simple7) (Chem, Bio, Bot, Med) simple8) (Gram) [sentence, tense] simple2.CPDsimple division N — división f simple
simple equation N — ecuación f de primer grado
simple fraction N — fracción f simple
simple interest N — interés m simple
simple majority N — (Pol) mayoría f simple
Simple Simon N — tontorrón m, simplón m, alma m de cántaro (Sp)
simple tense N — (Gram) tiempo m simple
* * *['sɪmpəl]1) ( uncomplicated) <task/problem> sencillo, simplethe machine is very simple to use — la máquina es de fácil manejo or es fácil de manejar
2) ( straightforward)the simple truth is (that)... — la pura verdad es que...
it's a simple statement of fact — es simplemente or meramente la constatación de un hecho
for the simple reason that... — por la sencilla razón de que...
3) (plain, unpretentious) <dress/food> sencillo, simple4)a) (unsophisticated, humble) simpleb) ( backward) simple, corto de alcances5) < interest> simple -
14 Knowledge
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)"Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
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15 solid
'solid
1. adjective1) (not easily changing shape; not in the form of liquid or gas: Water becomes solid when it freezes; solid substances.) sólido2) (not hollow: The tyres of the earliest cars were solid.) macizo3) (firm and strongly made (and therefore sound and reliable): That's a solid piece of furniture; His argument is based on good solid facts/reasoning.) sólido4) (completely made of one substance: This bracelet is made of solid gold; We dug till we reached solid rock.) macizo5) (without breaks, gaps or flaws: The policemen formed themselves into a solid line; They are solid in their determination to strike.) de una sola pieza6) (having height, breadth and width: A cube is a solid figure.) sólido7) (consecutive; without a pause: I've been working for six solid hours.) seguido, ininterrumpido
2. adverb(without interruption; continuously: She was working for six hours solid.) ininterrumpidamente
3. noun1) (a substance that is solid: Butter is a solid but milk is a liquid.) sólido2) (a shape that has length, breadth and height.) sólido•- solidify
- solidification
- solidity
- solidness
- solidly
- solid fuel
solid adj1. sólido2. macizotr['sɒlɪd]1 (not liquid or gas) sólido,-a2 (not hollow) macizo,-a3 (dense, compact) compacto,-a4 (unmixed) puro,-a, macizo,-a5 (strong) sólido,-a, fuerte6 (reliable) sólido,-a, de confianza, de fiar7 (unanimous) unánime8 (continuous) seguido,-a, entero,-a; (unbroken) continuo,-a9 SMALLTECHNICAL/SMALL (three-dimensional) tridimensional1 (substance) sólido■ solids, liquids and gasses sólidos, líquidos y gases\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLas solid as a rock firme como una rocato become solid solidificarsesolid figure cuerpo sólidosolid geometry geometría del espaciosolid ['sɑləd] adj1) : macizoa solid rubber ball: una bola maciza de caucho2) cubic: tridimensional3) compact: compacto, denso4) sturdy: sólido5) continuous: seguido, continuotwo solid hours: dos horas seguidasa solid line: una línea continua6) unanimous: unánime7) dependable: serio, fiable8) pure: macizo, purosolid gold: oro macizosolid n: sólido madj.• compacto, -a adj.• consistente adj.• denso, -a adj.• duro, -a adj.• enterizo, -a adj.• fijo, -a adj.• firme adj.• macizo, -a adj.• sólido, -a adj.• unánime adj.n.• macizo s.m.• sólido s.m.
I 'sɑːləd, 'sɒlɪd1)a) ( not liquid or gaseous) sólidosolid food — alimentos mpl sólidos
to become solid — solidificarse*
b) ( not hollow) <rubber ball/tire> macizoc) ( Math) tridimensional2)a) ( unbroken) <line/row> continuo, ininterrumpidob) ( continuous) (colloq) <month/year> seguido3)a) ( physically sturdy) <furniture/house> sólido; < meal> consistenteb) (substantial, valuable) <knowledge/reason> sólidoc) (firm, definite) < offer> en firme4)b) ( unanimous) <support/agreement> unánime
II
1)a) (Chem, Phys) sólido mb) ( Math) sólido m2) solids pla) (in, from liquid) sólidos mpl, sustancias fpl sólidasb) ( food) alimentos mpl sólidos
III
adverb (colloq)['sɒlɪd]to be packed/jammed solid — estar* lleno hasta el tope or hasta los topes
1. ADJ1) (=not liquid) sólido•
to become solid — solidificarse•
to freeze solid — congelarse por completo•
to be frozen solid — estar completamente congelado•
to go solid — solidificarse2) (=firm) [masonry, building, understanding, basis] sólido; [argument] sólido, bien fundamentado; [relationship] sólido, firme•
get a good solid grip on the handle — agarra bien el mangoto have solid grounds for thinking that... — tener bases sólidas para creer que...
3) (=not hollow) [rock] sólido; [wood, steel] macizo, puro; [tyre, ball, block] macizo4) (=compact, dense) [layer, crowd] compacto•
flights to Israel are booked solid — los vuelos a Israel están completamente llenos•
a solid mass of colour — una masa sólida de color•
the streets were packed solid with people — las calles estaban abarrotadas de gente•
the bolts have rusted solid — los tornillos están tan oxidados que es imposible girarlos•
the traffic was solid going into town — había una caravana tremenda en dirección a la ciudad *5) (=continuous) [line, rain] ininterrumpidoI've been working on this for eight hours solid — he estado trabajando sobre esto durante ocho horas ininterrumpidas, llevo trabajando sobre esto ocho horas sin parar
6) (=reliable) [person, relationship] serio; [evidence, reason, values] sólido; [information] fiable; [work] concienzudo; [citizen] responsable; [advice] útil7) (=substantial)8) (=unanimous)9) (Geom) [figure] tridimensional2. N1) (Phys, Chem) sólido m2) (Geom) sólido mis he on solids yet? — ¿come ya alimentos sólidos?
3.CPDsolid angle N — (Geom) ángulo m sólido
solid compound N — (Ling) compuesto que se escribe como una sola palabra
solid fuel N — combustible m sólido
solid geometry N — geometría f de los cuerpos sólidos
* * *
I ['sɑːləd, 'sɒlɪd]1)a) ( not liquid or gaseous) sólidosolid food — alimentos mpl sólidos
to become solid — solidificarse*
b) ( not hollow) <rubber ball/tire> macizoc) ( Math) tridimensional2)a) ( unbroken) <line/row> continuo, ininterrumpidob) ( continuous) (colloq) <month/year> seguido3)a) ( physically sturdy) <furniture/house> sólido; < meal> consistenteb) (substantial, valuable) <knowledge/reason> sólidoc) (firm, definite) < offer> en firme4)b) ( unanimous) <support/agreement> unánime
II
1)a) (Chem, Phys) sólido mb) ( Math) sólido m2) solids pla) (in, from liquid) sólidos mpl, sustancias fpl sólidasb) ( food) alimentos mpl sólidos
III
adverb (colloq)to be packed/jammed solid — estar* lleno hasta el tope or hasta los topes
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16 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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17 simple
adjective1) (not compound, not complicated) einfach; (not elaborate) schlicht [Mobiliar, Schönheit, Kunstwerk, Kleidung]2) (unqualified, absolute) einfach; simpelit was a simple misunderstanding — es war [ganz] einfach ein Missverständnis
it is a simple fact that... — es ist [ganz] einfach eine Tatsache od. eine simple Tatsache, dass...
3) (easy) einfachit's [not] as simple as that — so einfach ist das [nicht]
4) (unsophisticated) schlicht; (foolish) dumm; einfältig* * *['simpl]1) (not difficult; easy: a simple task.) einfach2) (not complicated or involved: The matter is not as simple as you think.) einfach3) (not fancy or unusual; plain: a simple dress/design; He leads a very simple life.) schlicht4) (pure; mere: the simple truth.) rein5) (trusting and easily cheated: She is too simple to see through his lies.) naiv6) (weak in the mind; not very intelligent: I'm afraid he's a bit simple, but he's good with animals.) einfältig•- academic.ru/67357/simpleton">simpleton- simplicity
- simplification
- simplified
- simplify
- simply
- simple-minded
- simple-mindedness* * *sim·ple<-r, -st or more \simple, most \simple>[ˈsɪmpl̩]I want an explanation, but keep it \simple ich möchte eine einfache Erklärung2. (not difficult) einfachit's not as \simple as that das ist nicht ganz so einfachin \simple English in einfachem Englischa \simple life form eine schlichte Lebensformthat's the truth, pure and \simple das ist die reine Wahrheitthe \simple fact is that... Tatsache ist, dass...for the \simple reason that... aus dem schlichten [o einfachen] Grund, dass...he was just a \simple fisherman er war nur ein einfacher Fischerthe \simple things in life die einfachen Dinge im Leben6. (foolish) naiv* * *['sɪmpl]adj (+er)1) (= uncomplicated, easy) einfach"chemistry made simple" — "Chemie leicht gemacht"
2) (= plain, not elaborate) einfach; decor, dress schlicht, einfachin simple terms —
in simple language — in einfacher Sprache
the simple fact that... —
for the simple reason that... — aus dem einfachen or schlichten Grund, dass...
it's a simple matter of finding adequate finance — es geht ganz einfach darum, angemessene finanzielle Mittel zu finden
3) (= unsophisticated, unworldly) einfach, schlichtI'm a simple soul — ich bin ein einfacher Mensch
she likes the simple life —
4) (= foolish, mentally deficient) einfältig* * *simple [ˈsımpl]1. einfach, simpel (Aufgabe, Erklärung etc):it was as simple as that so einfach war das2. einfach, schlicht (Leben, Person etc):simple diet einfache Kost3. einfach, schlicht:a) schmucklos, kunstlosb) ungekünstelt (Stil etc):simple beauty schlichte Schönheit4. einfach, niedrig:5. rein, unverfälscht:6. simpel:a) einfältig, törichtb) unbedarft, ungebildetc) naiv, leichtgläubig7. einfach, unkompliziert (Design etc);8. einfach (Diebstahl, Gleichung etc):simple majority PARL einfache Mehrheit;simple tense LING einfache Zeit(form)9. gering(fügig), unbedeutend10. glatt, rein (Wahnsinn etc)11. MUS allg einfach (Ton etc)B s obs2. PHARM Heilkraut n, -pflanze f* * *adjective1) (not compound, not complicated) einfach; (not elaborate) schlicht [Mobiliar, Schönheit, Kunstwerk, Kleidung]2) (unqualified, absolute) einfach; simpelit was a simple misunderstanding — es war [ganz] einfach ein Missverständnis
it is a simple fact that... — es ist [ganz] einfach eine Tatsache od. eine simple Tatsache, dass...
3) (easy) einfachit's [not] as simple as that — so einfach ist das [nicht]
4) (unsophisticated) schlicht; (foolish) dumm; einfältig* * *adj.einfach adj.einfältig adj. -
18 real
̈ɪrɪəl I
1. прил.
1) реальный, реально существующий, действительный тж. филос. real existence ≈ реальное сущестование real life ≈ реальная жизнь
2) подлинный, истинный, несомненный, бесспорный;
натуральный
3) неподдельный, непритворный;
искренний
4) недвижимый( об имуществе) real property ≈ недвижимость ∙ the real Simon Pure ≈ не подделка, нечто настоящее real thing ≈ первоклассная вещь
2. сущ.
1) (the real) действительность, реальность;
реальный предмет
2) мат. реальное число
3. нареч.
1) реально, действительно An opportunity of doing a real good office. ≈ Возможность создать действительно хороший офис. It looks real nice. ≈ Это выглядит действительно хорошо. Syn: really, genuinely
2) амер. весьма, действительно, очень, сильно, совсем Syn: very, much II сущ. реал (старая серебряная монета Испании и испаноязычных стран) (философское) действительность нечто реальное, конкретное, вещественное;
предмет, вещь > are you for *? (американизм) (сленг) вы не шутите?, не может быть!;
это просто невероятно! (выражает радостное удивление) > they were fighting for * они дрались не на шутку действительный, реальный, действительно существующий - * events реальные события - * life действительность - to constitute a * danger представлять (собой) несомненную /реальную/ опасность - a * oasis, not a mirage это настоящий оазис, а не мираж - these things are * and no fancies все это реально существующие вещи, а не плод воображения - you wouldn't find such a character in * life в жизни такие типы не встречаются - the characters in the play seem quite * персонажи пьесы - живые люди настоящий, натуральный - * silk натуральный шелк - * gold настоящее золото - * and paper flowers живые и бумажные цветы настоящий, истинный, подлинный - * friend настоящий /истинный/ друг - a man's * character чье-л. истинное лицо - the * reason настоящая /истинная/ причина - what is the man's * name? как его настоящая фамилия? - he is a * man он настоящий человек, он человек с большой буквы - there is no * doubt about it в сущности в этом никто не сомневался (эмоционально-усилительно) сущий, отъявленный - a * nuisance сущее мучение неподдельный, непритворный - to feel * grief искренне сокрушаться - he has a * interest in art он по-настоящему интересуется искусством;
его интерес к искусству несомненен простой, искренний ( о человеке) - she is such a * person в ней нет ни капли притворства /ничего напускного/ (экономика) реальный - * wages реальная зарплата (юридическое) (экономика) недвижимый - * property assets недвижимая собственность - * servitude земельный сервитут( философское) действительно существующий;
реальный существенный, относящийся к сущности (в противоп. феноменальному, относящемуся к явлению) истинный, абсолютный - * beauty истинная красота, идеал красоты самосуществующий (специальное) истинный - * time (компьютерное) реальное время - * image (оптика) действительное изображение( юридическое) вещный - * action вещный иск - * security реальное обеспечение (математика) вещественный;
действительный - * number действительное /вещественное/ число > the * thing настоящая вещь;
первоклассное произведение;
то, что нужно;
"настоящее дело", война (в отличие от маневров) ;
"серьезная вещь" (о любви в отличие от увлечения и т. п.) > * money металлические деньги;
звонкая монета;
наличные деньги > the * presence( церковное) истинное присутствия (Христа в причастии) (просторечие) действительно, в действительности преим. (американизм) (эмоционально-усилительно) очень, крайне, чрезвычайно - a * fine day чудесный день - I was * glad я был ужасно рад - it's * sweet! чудесно!, какая прелесть! (pl тж. reis) (историческое) реал (денежная единица Португалии и Бразилии) the actor drank ~ wine on the stage актер пил настоящее вино на сцене real вчт. вещественное число ~ вещественное число ~ вещный ~ действительный, настоящий, реальный, подлинный, истинный, неподдельный, несомненный;
the real state of affairs действительное положение вещей ~ действительный ~ исчисленный в постоянных ценах ~ настоящий ~ натуральный ~ недвижимый (об имуществе) ;
real property недвижимость;
the real thing первоклассная вещь;
the real Simon Pure не подделка, нечто настоящее ~ недвижимый (о собственности) ~ недвижимый ~ неподдельный ~ несомненный ~ разг. очень, действительно, совсем ~ реал (старая испанская монета) ~ реальный, действительный, настоящий, несомненный ~ реальный ~the ~ действительность ~ недвижимый (об имуществе) ;
real property недвижимость;
the real thing первоклассная вещь;
the real Simon Pure не подделка, нечто настоящее ~ действительный, настоящий, реальный, подлинный, истинный, неподдельный, несомненный;
the real state of affairs действительное положение вещей ~ недвижимый (об имуществе) ;
real property недвижимость;
the real thing первоклассная вещь;
the real Simon Pure не подделка, нечто настоящее -
19 Emotion
.. propose that reason may not be as pure as most of us think it is or wish it were, that emotions and feelings may not be intruders in the bastion of reason at all: they may be enmeshed in its networks, for worse and for better.The strategies of human reason probably did not develop, in either evolution or any single individual, without the guiding force of the mechanisms of biological regulation, of which emotion and feeling are notable expressions. Moreover, even after reasoning strategies become established in the formative years, their effective deployment probably depends, to a considerable extent, on a continued ability to experience feelings.This is not to deny that emotions and feelings can cause havoc in the processes of reasoning under certain circumstances. Traditional wisdom has told us that they can, and recent investigations of the normal reasoning process also reveal the potentially harmful influence of emotional biases. It is thus even more surprising and novel that the absence of emotion and feeling is no less damaging, no less capable of compromising the rationality that makes us distinctly human and allows us to decide in consonance with a sense of personal future, social convention, and moral principle. (Damasio, 1994, p. xii)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Emotion
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20 Mathematics
The world of mathematics, which you contemn, is really a beautiful world; it has nothing to do with life and death and human sordidness, but is eternal, cold and passionless. To me pure mathematics is one of the highest forms of art; it has a sublimity quite special to itself, and an immense dignity derived from the fact that its world is exempt from change and time. I am quite serious in this....athematics is the only thing we know of that is capable of perfection; in thinking about it we become Gods. (Russell [to Helen Thomas, 30 December 1901], 1992, Letter No. 98, p. 224)One of the deepest problems of nature is the success of mathematics as a language for describing and discovering features of physical reality. In short, why does mathematics work?...We humans have stripped back the clouds that cloak our understanding of our cosmic beginning and our current persistence to the stage that exposes the mathematical structure of the world more clearly than it has ever been observed before.... Furthermore, the attention of seriously equipped thinkers, those thinkers we call scientists, is at last beginning to turn to that other great conundrum of being: consciousness.... If we can understand why that supreme construct of the human intellect, that archdisembodiment of intellect, mathematics, works as a description of the world, then maybe we shall have an insight into cognition....The name deep structuralism is intended to convey the idea that the physical world has the same logical structure as mathematics. By implication, the reason why mathematics works as a description of physical reality is that they share the same logical structure.... By weak deep structuralism I shall mean that mathematics and physical reality merely share the same logical structure and mathematics is a mirror that can be held up to nature. By strong deep structuralism I shall mean that mathematics and physical reality do not merely share the same logical structure but are actually the same. In other words, according to the hypothesis of strong deep structuralism, physical reality is mathematics and mathematics is physical reality.... The reason why we may be conscious of the world, including the inner, introspective world of emotion and intellect, may be that our brains are material portrayals of the same deep structure. That may also be the reason why brains can generate the mathematics that we need to comprehend the world. (Atkins, 1992, pp. 99-101, 109-111)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mathematics
См. также в других словарях:
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